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A Survey and Critique of the “Seller in
Possession” Statutory Regimes of
Common Law Canada: An ABC Prequel

The article examines the various provincial and territorial statutory regimes that
apply to resolve title disputes emanating from a “seller in possession” scenario
in which an initial buyer leaves bought goods in the possession of a seller
who then transfers them to a subsequent bona mde purchaser. Presently there
are four distinct statutory models in force across common law Canada. Some
provinces and territories incorporate modernized electronic personal property
registry infrastructure into their statutory priority regimes, while others do not.
The author undertakes a comparative assessment of the four models, highlights
their strengths and weaknesses, and asserts that Model 2—representative of the
statutory regimes of Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut
and Saskatchewan—most appropriately demnes the initial buyer’s risk exposure
while offering reasonable registration facilities for the protection of his or her nonpossessory ownership interest.

L’article examine les divers régimes législatifs provinciaux et territoriaux qui
s’appliquent au règlement des différends relatifs au titre de propriété découlant
d’un scénario où un acheteur initial laisse les biens achetés en la possession
d’un vendeur qui les transfère ensuite à un acheteur de bonne foi subséquent.
À l’heure actuelle, quatre modèles législatifs distincts sont en vigueur dans
l’ensemble du Canada sous le régime de la common law. Certaines provinces et
certains territoires intègrent l’infrastructure modernisée du registre électronique
des biens personnels dans leurs régimes de priorité prévus par la loi, tandis
que d’autres ne le font pas. L’auteur entreprend une évaluation comparative
des quatre modèles, souligne leurs forces et leurs faiblesses et afmrme que le
modèle no 2—représentatif des régimes législatifs de l’Alberta, de la ColombieBritannique, des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, du Nunavut et de la Saskatchewan
—démnit le mieux l’exposition initiale de l’acheteur au risque tout en offrant des
mesures d’enregistrement raisonnables pour protéger son titre de participation
sans possession.
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It is not worth while to try to keep history from repeating itself, for man’s character will
always make the preventing of the repetitions impossible.
—Mark Twain, In Eruption1

Introduction
I wrote about ABCD remoteness problems in my last paper2 so this one,
addressing mere ABC problems, constitutes a prequel of sorts. Suppose
that A sells goods to B, but A retains possession of those goods and,
1.
Mark Twain, In Eruption (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1922) at 66.
2.
Clayton Bangsund, “ABCD Remoteness Problems: Nemo Dat & Its Exceptions Under
Subsection 26(1.2) of Saskatchewan’s The Sale of Goods Act” (2018) 81:2 Sask L Rev 133.
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without authorization, resells them to C. A dispute between B and C erupts
since, in Bridge’s words, “rogue [A] invariably disappears or turns out to
be not worth suing, taking with him the purchase price. So the question
normally resolves itself into an inquiry that has inspired countless judicial
cris de couer, namely, which of two innocent persons, the owner [B] or
the purchaser [C], should suffer the consequences of the rogue’s [A’s]
dishonesty.”3 My object, in this paper, is to survey and critique the various
statutory regimes of common law Canada that apply to resolve this kind
of title dispute. Presently there are four distinct statutory models in effect
among the twelve common law jurisdictions:
 Model 1—Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon
 Model 2—Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut,
Saskatchewan
 Model 3—New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia
 Model 4—Prince Edward Island

As a general matter, statutory uniformity is both an aim and the norm
in Canadian sale of goods law.4 Governance of the “seller in possession”
ABC problem presents a rare and interesting exception. In Canada,
depending on where these events unfold, the dispute between B and C is
resolved quite differently according to unique criteria set out in a variety
of statutes. Some provinces and territories resolve the matter through
statutory priority rules that hinge on fact and time of registration in the
personal property registry, while others do not.
In Part II of this paper, using an incremental approach, I describe the
basic features of each of the four models using the legislative regimes of
Ontario, Alberta, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island as proxies for
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.5 In Part III I undertake a comparative
assessment of the models, highlighting their relative strengths and
weaknesses. In Part IV I offer some closing remarks.
I.

Description

1. Nemo Dat: A Common Starting Point
The starting point, across all jurisdictions and under each statutory model,
is nemo dat quod non habet—“one cannot give what one does not have.”
With reference to the ABC problem, B prevails over C according to a strict
application of nemo dat because, after transferring title to B, A no longer

3.
MG Bridge, Sale of Goods (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at 571 (bracketed text added).
4.
Roderick J Wood, “Codi¿cation of Commercial Law” (2016) 79:2 Sask L Rev 179.
5.
Details of concordance are furnished in the footnotes. Where appropriate, one of the four model
proxies also serves as a pan-Canadian proxy.
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has any title to transmit to C. Serving as a pan-Canadian proxy, section 24
of Nova Scotia’s Sale of Goods Act6 is reproduced below.
NSSGA, section 24: Subject to this Act, where goods are sold by a person
who is not the owner thereof and who does not sell them under the
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better
title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by
his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.7

Bridge notes that “[a] legal system concerned with the protection of
private property, and not open to any countervailing interests, would assert
with unabated vigour the maxim nemo dat quod non habet, by which the
transferee’s [C’s] title could never exceed the title of the transferor [A] and
would always be vulnerable to the claim of another whose title is superior
[B].”8 We do not live in such a system. As suggested in the provision’s
opening words—“[s]ubject to this Act, …”—Canadian legislators have
seen ¿t to recognize various statutory exceptions to nemo dat.9
2. “Seller in Possession” Exception to Nemo Dat: More Common
Ground
Ontario’s OSGA s. 25(1), reproduced below, serves as the pan-Canadian
proxy for the statutory exception to nemo dat potentially available to C in
our “seller in possession” ABC scenario. Every Canadian common law
jurisdiction has in force at least one substantive concordant to OSGA s.
25(1), while ¿ve such jurisdictions—Alberta, New Brunswick, Northwest
Territories, Nunavut and Saskatchewan—have two (one in the Sale of
Goods Act, the other in the Factors Act).
OSGA, subsection 25(1): Where a person having sold goods continues
or is in possession of the goods or of the documents of title to the goods,
the delivery or transfer by that person, or by a mercantile agent acting
for that person, of the goods or documents of title under a sale, pledge or
other disposition thereof to a person receiving the goods or documents of
title in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, has the same

6.
Sale of Goods Act, RSNS 1989, c 408 [NSSGA].
7.
Ibid s 24. See also Alberta—Sale of Goods Act, RSA 2000, c S-2, s 23(1) [ASGA]; British
Columbia—Sale of Goods Act, RSBC 1996, c 410, s 26(1) [BCSGA]; Manitoba—The Sale of Goods
Act, RSM 1987, c S1, s 23 [MSGA]; New Brunswick—Sale of Goods Act, RSNB 2016, c 110, s
28 [NBSGA]; Newfoundland & Labrador—Sale of Goods Act, RSNL 1990, c S-6, s 23 [NLSGA];
Northwest Territories and Nunavut—Sale of Goods Act, RSNWT 1988, c S-2, s 25(1) [NWTSGA], as
duplicated for Nunavut by s 29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28 [NSGA]; Ontario—Sale of Goods
Act, RSO 1990, c S.1, s 22 [OSGA]; Prince Edward Island—Sale of Goods Act, RSPEI 1988, c S-1, s
23 [PEISGA]; Saskatchewan—The Sale of Goods Act, RSS 1978, c S-1, s 23(1) [SSGA]; Yukon—Sale
of Goods Act, RSY 2002, c 198, s 22(1) [YSGA].
8.
Bridge, supra note 3 at 570 (bracketed text added).
9.
See GHL Fridman, Sale of Goods in Canada, 6th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 107-128.
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effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly
authorized by the owner of the goods to make the delivery or transfer.10

The provision recognizes an explicit exception to nemo dat where buyer
B leaves goods (or documents of title11) in the possession of seller A
who subsequently sells, pledges or otherwise disposes of them to buyer
C, an acquirer in good faith without notice of B’s interest.12 Although A
no longer owns the goods, the subsection enables her to convey title as
if B had expressly authorized her to do so. Accordingly, C can rely on
A’s possession of the goods as suf¿cient proof of her ownership and/or
authority to sell. Subsection 25(1) of the OSGA recognizes an exception
to nemo dat based on a policy of protecting innocent purchasers who
rely on A’s possession as a badge of authority. The provision operates as
a defence to B’s action in conversion against C.13 To the extent that it
operates, C acquires title to the goods thereby defeating B’s interest under
this statutory exception to nemo dat.14
I have written elsewhere, in considerable detail, about the history and
judicial interpretation of this provision.15 I will not reproduce that effort
10. OSGA, supra note 7, s 25(1). See also Alberta—ASGA, supra note 7, s 26(1); Factors Act, RSA
2000, c F-1, s 9(1) [Alberta Factors Act]; British Columbia—BCSGA, supra note 7, s 30(1); Manitoba
—MSGA, supra note 7, s 28(1); New Brunswick—NBSGA, supra note 7, s 31(2) and (4); Factors
and Agents Act, RSNB 2011, c 153, ss 13(1) and (2) [NB Factors Act]; Newfoundland & Labrador
—NLSGA, supra note 7, s 27(1); Nova Scotia – NSSGA, supra note 7, s 28(2); Northwest Territories
—NWTSGA, supra note 7, s 27(2); Factors Act, RSNWT 1988, c F-1, s 8(1) [NWT Factors Act], as
duplicated for Nunavut by s 29 of the Nunavut Act [Nunavut Factors Act]; Nunavut—NSGA, supra
note 7, s 27(2); Nunavut Factors Act, s 8(1); Prince Edward Island—Factors Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-1,
s 9(1) [PEI Factors Act]; Saskatchewan—SSGA, supra note 7, s 26(1); The Factors Act, RSS 1978,
c F-1, s 9(1) [Saskatchewan Factors Act]; Yukon—YSGA, supra note 7, s 24(1). Note the slightly
broader scope of the various Factors Act provisions in comparison with their Sale of Goods Act
counterparts. British Columbia’s BCSGA presents an exception in that it adopts the broader language
typically seen in the Factors Acts: see Bridge, supra note 3 at 634.
11. To avoid unnecessary convolution, this paper focuses on resolution of the dispute described in the
paper’s opening paragraph, which does not involve goods embodied in a negotiable document of title.
Where a warehouse receipt is involved, yet another statutory exception to nemo dat may be available
to C in eight of Canada’s twelve common law jurisdictions: Alberta—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSA
2000, c W-1, s 28; British Columbia—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSBC 1996, c 481, s 27; Manitoba—
The Warehouse Receipts Act, RSM 1987, c W30, s 28; New Brunswick—Warehouse Receipts Act,
RSNB 2011, c 236, s 27; Newfoundland & Labrador—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSNL 1990, c W-1,
s 28; Nova Scotia—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSNS 1989, c 498, s 28; Ontario—Warehouse Receipts
Act, RSO 1990, c W3, s 27; Yukon—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSY 2002, c 227, s 27.
12. Bridge, supra note 3 at 547.
13. See e.g. Bartin Pipe & Piling Supply Ltd v Epscan Industries Ltd, 2004 ABCA 52 at para 42
[Bartin Pipe].
14. See Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering Co Ltd, [1971] 3 All ER 708 (CA),
[1971] 3 WLR 661; National Trust Co v Kirch (1993), 12 OR (3d) 781 (Gen Div), [1993] OJ No
765; Kosolofsky v Pasta D’Aurum (Canada) Inc, 2000 SKQB 164; Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd v
Wilkinson and another, [2001] QB 514.
15. Bangsund, supra note 2 at 142-146.
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here, but instead furnish an abbreviated account of the provision’s lineage.
A version of the provision was originally enacted under the Factors
Act, 187716 as an expedited statutory response to a controversial pair of
decisions17 that left the ¿nancial industry dissatis¿ed with the state of late
nineteenth century English law.18 The provision was soon broadened and
restated in England’s consolidated Factors Act, 1889,19 then substantially
replicated in slightly narrower language under the Sale of Goods Act,
1893,20 a comprehensive codi¿cation of the common law of sales of the
time.21 All Canadian common law jurisdictions eventually copied the
English provision.22 At present day, in every jurisdiction in common law
Canada, at least one version of the Victorian era statutory exception to
nemo dat—as originally formulated in the Factors Act, 1889 and the Sale
of Goods Act, 1893—potentially applies to resolve “seller in possession”
ABC disputes.
a. Model 1—Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon
Under Model 1, the analysis ends with the Victorian era provision as
enacted in the legislation of the province or territory. Where B leaves
bought goods in A’s possession in any of Manitoba, Ontario or Yukon,
the statutory exception to nemo dat applies and C enjoys title to the goods
free and clear under a subsequent sale provided she acquires possession in
good faith and without notice of B’s interest.

16. Factors Act 1877 (UK), 40 & 41 Vict, c 39, s 3 [Factors Act 1877].
17. Johnson v The Credit Lyonnais and Johnson v Blumenthal (1877), 3 CPD 32, 37 LT 657
(CA) aff’g Johnson v The Credit Lyonnais (1877), 2 CPD 224, 36 LT 253 (CP Div) and Johnson v
Blumenthal, unreported.
18. Factors Act 1877, Preamble: “WHEREAS doubts have arisen with respect to the true meaning
of certain provisions of the Factors’ Acts, and it is expedient to remove such doubts and otherwise
to amend the said Acts, for the better security of persons buying or making advances on goods, or
documents of title to goods, in the usual and ordinary course of mercantile business.”
19. Factors Act 1889 (UK), 52 & 53 Vict, c 45.
20. Sale of Goods Act 1893 (UK), 56 & 57 Vict, c 71.
21. MD Chalmers, The Sale of Goods, including the Factors Act, 1889, 1st ed (London: William
Clowes and Sons, 1890) at iv.
22. Royston Miles Goode & Ewan McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, 4th ed (London:
Penguin Books, 2010) at 7, 205.
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3. Resurrection of Nemo Dat: Divergence
a. Model 2—Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut,
Saskatchewan
Unlike Model 1, Model 2, representing the law of Alberta, British
Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Saskatchewan, offers B
registration-based protection in the case of a deferred-possession sale
arrangement. Consider Alberta’s ASGA s. 26(2),23 which serves as proxy
for Model 2 jurisdictions.
ASGA, subsection 26(2): Subsection (1) does not apply to a sale, pledge
or other disposition of goods or of documents of title to goods, other
than negotiable documents of title to goods, that is out of the ordinary
course of business of the person having sold the goods where, prior to
the sale, pledge or disposition, the interest of the owner is registered in
the Personal Property Registry in accordance with the regulations made
under the Personal Property Security Act, and Part 4 of that Act applies,
with the necessary modi¿cations, to that registration.24

Subsection 26(2) of the ASGA adopts Part 4 (Registration) of Alberta’s
Personal Property Security Act25 and Personal Property Security
Regulation26 thereby enabling B, a buyer out of possession,27 to register

23. See also Alberta Factors Act, supra note 10, s 9(2): “Subsection (1) does not apply to a sale,
pledge or other disposition of goods or of documents of title to goods, other than negotiable documents
of title to goods, that is out of the ordinary course of business of the person having sold the goods
where, prior to the sale, pledge or disposition, the interest of the owner is registered in the Personal
Property Registry in accordance with the regulations made under the Personal Property Security Act,
and Part 4 of that Act applies to that registration.”
24. ASGA, supra note 7, s 26(2). See also Alberta—Alberta Factors Act, supra note 10, s 9(2);
British Columbia—BCSGA, supra note 7, s 30(2); Northwest Territories—NWTSGA, supra note 7, s
27(2.1); NWT Factors Act, supra note 10, s 8(2); Nunavut—NSGA, supra note 10, s 27(2.1); Nunavut
Factors Act, supra note 10, s 8(2); Saskatchewan—SSGA, supra note 10, s 26(1.1); Saskatchewan
Factors Act, supra note 10, s 9(2).
25. Personal Property Security Act, RSA 2000, c P-7. See also Personal Property Security Act,
RSBC 1996, c 359; Personal Property Security Act, SNWT 1994, c 8, as duplicated for Nunavut by s
29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28; The Personal Property Security Act, 1993, SS 1993, c P-6.2.
26. Personal Property Security Regulation, Alta Reg 95/2001 [Alberta Regulations]. See also
Personal Property Security Regulation, BC Reg 227/2002 [BC Regulations]; Personal Property
Security Regulations, NWT Reg R-066-2001 [NWT Regulations]; Consolidation of Personal Property
Security Regulations, Nu Reg 007-2001 [Nunavut Regulations]; The Personal Property Security
Regulations, RRS c P-6.2 Reg 1 [Saskatchewan Regulations].
27. Alberta Regulations, supra note 26, s 1(1)(w)(ii): “‘secured party’ means, with respect to
registration of forms, where the registration is: …authorized under the Sale of Goods Act or the
Factors Act, a person who, having bought goods, leaves the goods or the documents of title to the
goods that are the subject of the registration in the possession of the seller,”; See also BC Regulations,
supra note 26, s 1(1), “secured party”; NWT Regulations, supra note 26, s 1, “secured party”; Nunavut
Regulations, supra note 26, s 1, “secured party”; Saskatchewan Regulations, supra note 26, s 2(1)(t)
(ii).
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notice of his ownership interest in the PPR against A.28 The subsection
resurrects nemo dat in favour of B, a buyer/owner out of possession,
provided B registers in timely fashion in accordance with the Alberta
Regulations by serial number in respect of serial numbered goods29 or by
item or kind in respect of all goods other than serial numbered goods.30
Under Model 2, B is unable to prevent A from conferring title to
C pursuant to an ordinary course sale. Registration offers B attenuated
protection, serving as a pre-condition to the categorical application of
nemo dat vis-à-vis C where C is a buyer outside the ordinary course.
Speci¿cally, ASGA s. 26(2) requires that B, the buyer/owner who occupies
a position analogous to that of a secured party, register notice of his interest
in the PPR if he wishes to preserve nemo dat and gain optimal protection
against third parties, like C, who deal with A in good faith outside the
ordinary course of business.31 B is protected against C provided he
properly registers notice of his interest in the PPR; the exception to nemo
dat in ASGA s. 26(1) no longer applies, and B prevails pursuant to the joint
application of ASGA ss. 23(1) and 26(2). This registration-based system,
which replaces repealed bills of sale legislation in Model 2 jurisdictions,32
is fully integrated with the PPR’s electronic notice-registration system and
enables C to discover B’s ownership by conducting a search of A’s name,
thus justifying an outcome in B’s favour.
To recap, Model 2 creates an attenuated title notice system under which
B’s registration in the PPR is a precondition to the categorical invocation
of nemo dat against subsequent non-ordinary course buyers. The system is
attenuated in the sense that a valid registration does not protect B against

28. Alberta Regulations, supra note 26, s 1(1)(j)(ii): “‘debtor’ means, with respect to all registration
forms, where the registration is: …authorized pursuant to the Sale of Goods Act or the Factors Act, a
person who, having sold goods, continues or is in possession of the goods or of the documents of title
to the goods that are the subject of the registration,”; See also BC Regulations, supra note 26, s 1(1),
“debtor”; NWT Regulations, supra note 26, s 1, “debtor”; Nunavut Regulations, supra note 26, s 1,
“debtor”; Saskatchewan Regulations, supra note 26, s 2(1)(h)(ii).
29. Alberta Regulations, supra note 26, s 30(a): “Where a ¿nancing statement is submitted for
registration, as authorized by the Factors Act or Sale of Goods Act, (a) goods that are serial numbered
goods must be described in accordance with section 35, and…”; See also BC Regulations, supra note
26, s 12(1)(a); NWT Regulations, supra note 26, s 34; Nunavut Regulations, supra note 26, s 34;
Saskatchewan Regulations, supra note 26, s 18(1)(a).
30. Alberta Regulations, supra note 26, s 30(b): “Where a ¿nancing statement is submitted for
registration, as authorized by the Factors Act or Sale of Goods Act, …(b) goods other than serial
numbered goods must be described in accordance with section 36(2)(a).” See also BC Regulations,
supra note 26, s 12(1)(b); NWT Regulations, supra note 26, s 33; Nunavut Regulations, supra note 26,
s 33; Saskatchewan Regulations, supra note 26, s 18(1)(b).
31. See E Dehr Delivery Ltd v Dehr, 2016 ABQB 714 at para 42.
32. For more information about bills of sale legislation, see Bangsund, ABCD Remoteness Problems,
supra note 2 at 147-148.
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subsequent ordinary course buyers who receive the goods in good faith
without notice of B’s interest.
4. Statutory Bifurcation: More Diversity
a. Model 3—New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia
Under Model 3, representing the law of New Brunswick, Newfoundland
& Labrador and Nova Scotia (the law of Nova Scotia serves as our Model
3 proxy), legal analysis of the “seller in possession” ABC problem is more
complicated. To determine which statutory system applies to resolve the
dispute, one must ¿rst examine the nature of the initial transaction between
A and B.
b. Deemed PPSA Security Interest
Where the transaction between A and B occurs outside the ordinary course
of A’s business, it is a “sale of goods without a change of possession”
within the meaning of Nova Scotia’s Personal Property Security Act.33
NSPPSA, s. 2(1)(an): “sale of goods without a change of possession”
means a sale of goods that is not accompanied by an immediate delivery
and an actual, apparent and continued change of possession of the
goods sold, but does not include a sale of goods in the ordinary course
of business of the seller, and for the purpose of this de¿nition, “sale”
includes an assignment, transfer, conveyance, declaration of trust or
any other agreement or transaction, not intended to secure payment or
performance of an obligation, by which an interest in goods is conferred;34

Under the NSPPSA, a sale of goods without a change of possession
creates a deemed security interest35 to which the statute applies.36 This
means that B, a secured party,37 must effect registration38 to perfect39 her
33. Personal Property Security Act, SNS 1995-96, c 13 [NSPPSA]. See also New Brunswick
—Personal Property Security Act, SNB 1993, c P-7.1 [NBPPSA]; Newfoundland & Labrador—
Personal Property Security Act, SNL 1998, c P-7.1 [NLPPSA].
34. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(an). See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “sale of goods
without a change of possession”; NLPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(ll).
35. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(ar)(ii)(D): “security interest” means…the interest of a buyer
under a sale of goods without a change of possession, that does not secure payment or performance of
an obligation; See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “security interest”; NLPPSA, supra note 33, s
2(1)(pp)(ii)(D).
36. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 4(2): Subject to Sections 5 and 56, this Act applies to…a sale of goods
without a change of possession, that does not secure payment or performance of an obligation; See
also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 3(2)(d); NLPPSA, supra note 33, s 4(2)(d).
37. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(ao). See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “secured party”;
NLPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(mm).
38. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 26. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 25; NLPPSA, supra note 33,
s 26.
39. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 20. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 19; NLPPSA, supra note 33,
s 20.
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security interest and gain optimal protection against C. Failure to effect
valid registration leaves B vulnerable to a variety of competitors including
buyers like C,40 lessees,41 secured parties42 and A’s trustee in bankruptcy.43
Even if B does effect valid registration, she remains vulnerable to C where,
for example, C buys the goods from A as consumer goods for a purchase
price of $1,000 or less.44 Under Model 3, where the initial sale from A to
B occurs outside the ordinary course of business, and therefore constitutes
a deemed security interest, the consequences are potentially dire if B fails
to effect valid registration at the PPR. By reason of the NSPPSA’s cut-off
rules, equally dire consequences may befall B even in cases where valid
registration has been effected.
c. “Seller in Possession” Exception to Nemo Dat
In contrast, where the initial sale from A to B occurs in the ordinary
course of A’s business, the NSSGA applies to resolve the matter according
to the traditional exception to nemo dat if C takes possession in good
faith without notice of B’s interest.45 Model 3, like Model 1, affords B
no formal registration-based protection against C in circumstances where
the initial sale to B occurs in the ordinary course of A’s business. In such
circumstances, B can only hope to somehow deliver actual notice of title
to C so as to disqualify her from invoking the statutory exception to nemo
dat.
5. Hybrid Model: Yet More Variety
a. Model 4—Prince Edward Island
Canada’s lone Model 4 jurisdiction, Prince Edward Island, is a hybrid
system that exhibits features of Models 2 and 3. Like Model 3, Model
4 bifurcates the statutory analysis based on the nature of the initial sale
transaction between A and B.

40. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 31. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 30; NLPPSA, supra note 33,
s 31.
41. Ibid.
42. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 36. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 35; NLPPSA, supra note 33,
s 36.
43. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 21(2)(a). See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 20(2)(a); NLPPSA, supra
note 33, s 21(1)(a).
44. NSPPSA, supra note 33, ss 31(3) and (4). See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, ss 30(3) and (4);
NLPPSA, supra note 33, ss 31(3) and (4).
45. NSSGA, supra note 6, s 28(2); NBSGA, supra note 7, ss 31(2), (4); NB Factors Act, supra note
10, ss 13(1) and (2); NLSGA, supra note 7, s 27(1).
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b. Deemed PPSA Security Interest
If the sale from A to B occurs outside the ordinary course of A’s business,
it constitutes a “sale of goods without a change of possession” within
the meaning of Prince Edward Island’s Personal Property Security Act.46
Models 3 and 4 exhibit likeness in this respect.
PEIPPSA, s. 1(nn): “sale of goods without a change of possession” means
a sale of goods that is not accompanied by an immediate delivery and an
actual, apparent and continued change of possession of the goods sold,
but does not include a sale of goods in the ordinary course of business
of the seller, and for the purpose of this de¿nition, “sale” includes an
assignment, transfer, conveyance, declaration of trust or any other
agreement or transaction, not intended to secure payment or performance
or an obligation, by which an interest in goods is conferred;47

A sale of goods without a change of possession creates a deemed
security interest48 under the PEIPPSA, thus making B a secured party.49
Accordingly, B must effect registration50 at the PPR to perfect his security
interest.51 Under Model 4, failure to register leaves B’s interest unperfected
and vulnerable to buyers and lessees,52 secured parties53 and A’s trustee in
bankruptcy.54
c. Resurrection of Nemo Dat
If the initial sale occurs in the ordinary course of A’s business, then
pursuant to PEI Factors Act s. 9(2) B must register notice of his interest
in the PPR if he wishes to preserve nemo dat and gain protection against
third parties, like C, who deal with A in good faith outside the ordinary
course of business. B is protected against C if he properly registers notice
of his interest in the PPR;55 the exception to nemo dat in PEI Factors Act
s. 9(1) no longer applies, and B prevails pursuant to the joint application
of PEISGA s. 23 and PEI Factors Act s. 9(2).
PEI Factors Act, subsection 9(2): Subsection (1) does not apply to a
sale, pledge or other disposition of goods or of documents of title to
goods, other than negotiable documents of title to goods, that is out of

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Personal Property Security Act, RSPEI 1988, c P-3.1 [PEIPPSA].
Ibid, s 1(nn).
Ibid, ss 1(r)(ii)(D), 3(2)(d).
Ibid, s 1(oo).
Ibid, s 25.
Ibid, s 19.
Ibid, s 30.
Ibid, s 35.
Ibid, s 20(2)(a).
Personal Property Security Act Regulations, PEI Reg EC1998-270, ss 22-24.
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the ordinary course of business of the person having sold the goods
where, prior to the sale, pledge or disposition, the interest of the owner
is registered in the Personal Property Registry in accordance with the
regulations made under the Personal Property Security Act and the said
Act applies to such registration.56

Like Model 2, Model 4 offers B effective registration-based protection
against C as a subsequent non-ordinary course buyer. That protection,
however, is not effective against a subsequent ordinary course
buyer. Failure to effect valid registration leaves B vulnerable to a
good faith non-ordinary course buyer who acquires the goods without
notice of B’s interest.
6. Recap
To brieÀy recap, Model 1 fully adopts the Victorian era “seller in possession”
exception to nemo dat and does not furnish, under any circumstances,
facilities for registration of B’s interest. In stark contrast, Model 2 is fully
integrated with the PPR’s electronic notice-registration system, furnishing
B with the option to register and protect her interest against subsequent
purchasers. Model 3 partially adopts the Victorian era exception where
the initial sale to B occurs in the ordinary course of A’s business. In such
a circumstance, Model 3 furnishes B with no statutory registration-based
protection. Meanwhile, if the initial sale takes place outside the ordinary
course of A’s business, Model 3 imposes a registration requirement on B
thereby exposing him to signi¿cant risk of loss. Finally, Model 4 gives B
the option to register where the initial sale occurs in the ordinary course of
A’s business, but imposes a registration requirement on B where the initial
sale occurs outside the ordinary course.
II. Analysis
1. Model 1—Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon
One praiseworthy feature of Model 1 is that it does not expose B to undue
risk of loss to the trustee should A go bankrupt while in possession of the
subject goods. This point is signi¿cant because, as a practical matter, it
is far more probable (at least one hopes, for the sake of humanity) that A
will (i) go bankrupt as an honest but unfortunate debtor than (ii) roguishly
resell B’s goods to C, an act that generally requires outright dishonesty or
extreme forgetfulness. In any case, B is not a secured party pursuant to
Model 1 personal property security legislation, and is therefore not at risk
of losing his title to the trustee in the event of A’s bankruptcy. Model 1
56.

PEI Factors Act, supra note 10, s 9(2).

³6HOOHULQ3RVVHVVLRQ´6WDWXWRU\5HJLPHVRI
&RPPRQ/DZLQ&DQDGD



narrowly de¿nes those eligible reliance parties—namely, innocent buyers
(such as C), pledgees and disponees—who, in appropriate circumstances,
may assert the “seller in possession” exception to nemo dat to defeat B’s
title. Model 1 is well-tailored in this respect, unlike Models 3 and 4.
Model 1 stands alone in offering B no formal registration-based
protection against C under any circumstances. While this system may be
lauded for its simplicity, one wonders why Model 1 legislators have chosen
not to facilitate deferred-possession sales using personal property registry
infrastructure designed precisely for the facilitation of non-possessory
interests in personal property. Each Model 1 jurisdiction once had in force
a Bills of Sale Act57 which has since been repealed.58 This means that where
there was once a centralized registration system for protection of B’s title
(however crude and inef¿cient it may have been), there is now nothing.
Model 1 can be criticized for not interacting with existing personal property
registry infrastructure to facilitate sales in which deferred possession is
part of a legitimate commercial arrangement.59
It is ironic that, under Model 1, an unauthorized registration effected by
a diligent and enterprising B—that is, a ¿nancing statement, unsanctioned
by any statutory regime, but nonetheless registered in the PPR by a
buyer out of possession posing as a secured party—may ultimately prove
successful in delivering notice of B’s ownership to C thereby defeating
the statutory exception to nemo dat that C would otherwise enjoy. If C is
a diligent buyer, she is likely to check the PPR for registered interests and
in so doing will discover B’s unauthorized registration. At ¿rst glance,
this informal use of the PPR, and the unof¿cial notice delivery system
it creates, may not seem objectionable because, in the above scenario, C
gains crucial knowledge that enables her to avoid a clash with B. In my
view, however, Model 1 is de¿cient because, if resort to the court system
does become necessary, a judge must embark on a costly, and potentially
protracted, fact-¿nding mission to discover whether C actually knew of
B’s ownership. This is precisely what Model 1’s personal property security
legislation is designed to avoid. Under the OPPSA, where B is a secured
party, it is the fact of B’s valid registration, not C’s knowledge thereof,
that is dispositive of the matter. But where the “seller in possession” ABC
57. Manitoba—The Bills of Sale Act, RSM 1954, c 17; Ontario—The Bills of Sale Act, RSO 1970,
c 44; Yukon—Bills of Sale Ordinance, ROYT 1971, c B-1.
58. Manitoba—An Act to Amend the Bills of Sale Act, SM 1973, c 7; Ontario—The Personal
Property Security Act, 1989, SO 1989, c 16; Yukon—The Personal Property Security Ordinance,
OYT 1980, c 20.
59. For cases illustrating deferred possession as a typical aspect of commercial arrangements see
e.g., Bartin Pipe, supra note 13; Alberta Treasury Branches v Cam Holdings LP, 2016 ABQB 33.
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problem presents itself and an enterprising B registers an unauthorized
¿nancing statement in the PPR claiming ownership of the goods, the
situation is reversed in Ontario, and the title dispute is resolved under
the OSGA according to the state of C’s actual knowledge. This statutory
asymmetry is bothersome.
As I have argued elsewhere, there is no convincing reason why sales
legislation cannot and should not accommodate B as a buyer/owner to at
least the same extent personal property security legislation accommodates
her as a secured party.60 If a modern registration-based system facilitates
secured transactions involving goods, protecting secured parties against
subsequent competitors like C, then surely it should facilitate sales of
those same goods on equally robust terms.
2. Model 2—Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut,
Saskatchewan
Model 2 exposes B to risk of loss against only certain parties who advance
value in reliance on A’s possession. Under Model 2, B is not at risk of
losing his title to A’s trustee in bankruptcy or, for example, a subsequent
non-possessory secured party. Like Model 1, Model 2 is well-tailored in
this respect.
By offering B formal, yet attenuated, registration-based protection in
the case of a deferred-possession sale, Model 2 addresses the de¿ciency
in Model 1. B may effect registration at the PPR and in so doing deprive
a non-ordinary course buyer, C, of the statutory exception to nemo dat
to which he would otherwise be entitled. Under Model 2, B receives
statutory protection roughly equivalent to that he would receive were
he a non-possessory secured party governed by the PPSA.61 One must
emphasize, however, that under Model 2, registration is a mere option, not
a requirement. A diligent buyer without possession may avail himself of
this registration option in appropriate circumstances. However, his failure
to effect a valid registration (including if he simply chooses not to register)
does not necessarily place him at undue risk of loss, and still leaves him
with nemo dat as a fallback position. In my view, this characteristic of
Model 2 makes it markedly superior to Models 3 and 4.
3. Model 3—New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia
Model 3 exposes B to material risk of loss against a variety of competitors
in an array of arguably unwarranted circumstances. To appreciate this risk,
one must ¿rst understand an extremely complicated statutory system. My
60. Bangsund, supra note 2 at 155.
61. Ibid at 149.
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¿UVWFULWLFLVPRI0RGHOLVWKDWLWLVIDUPRUHFRPSOH[WKDQ0RGHOVDQG
RQDFFRXQWRILWVFRQIXVLQJDQGXQQHFHVVDU\ELIXUFDWLRQRIWKHVWDWXWRU\
JRYHUQDQFHRI³VHOOHULQSRVVHVVLRQ´$%&SUREOHPV,WLVQRWHQWLUHO\FOHDU
ZK\WKHVWDWXWRU\V\VWHPWKDWDSSOLHVWRUHVROYHD³VHOOHULQSRVVHVVLRQ´
$%& GLVSXWH EHWZHHQ % DQG & VKRXOG YDU\ GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH QDWXUH RI
WKHLQLWLDOWUDQVDFWLRQEHWZHHQ$DQG%)URP&¶VSHUVSHFWLYH WKHSDUW\
DJDLQVW ZKRP %¶V ULJKWV ZLOO XOWLPDWHO\ EH PHDVXUHG  WKLV GLVWLQFWLRQ
LV DUELWUDU\ DQG PHDQLQJOHVV DQG LQ P\ YLHZ VKRXOG QRW SOD\ D UROH LQ
UHVROYLQJWKHWLWOHGLVSXWH<HWXQGHU0RGHOWKHGLVWLQFWLRQLVcritical
5HFDOO WKDW XQGHU 0RGHO  LI WKH VDOH IURP $ WR % RFFXUV LQ
WKH RUGLQDU\ FRXUVH RI$¶V EXVLQHVV WKHQ % LV QRW H[SHFWHG QRU LV VKH
JLYHQ DQ\ VWDWXWRU\ DXWKRUL]DWLRQ WR UHJLVWHU QRWLFH RI KHU RZQHUVKLS
LQ WKH 335 7KH PDWWHU LV UHVROYHG E\ VDOHV OHJLVODWLRQ nemo dat DQG
LWV NQRZOHGJHEDVHG H[FHSWLRQV <HW LI WKDW VDPH VDOH ZHUH WR RFFXU
XQGHU VOLJKWO\ GLIIHUHQW FLUFXPVWDQFHV RXWVLGH WKH RUGLQDU\ FRXUVH RI
$¶VEXVLQHVVWKHQSXUVXDQWWRSHUVRQDOSURSHUW\VHFXULW\OHJLVODWLRQ%LV
required²QRWPHUHO\JLYHQWKHRSWLRQ²WRHIIHFWUHJLVWUDWLRQDWWKH335
LQRUGHUWRJDLQRSWLPDOSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVW&DQGRWKHUV,WLVGLI¿FXOWWR
UDWLRQDOL]HWKLV-HN\OO +\GHOLNHFKDUDFWHURI0RGHO²RIIHULQJ%QR
UHJLVWUDWLRQEDVHG SURWHFWLRQ LQ VLWXDWLRQV WKDW DUJXDEO\ ZDUUDQW LW ZKLOH
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ LPSRVLQJ VWULQJHQW UHJLVWUDWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV LQ RWKHU
XQZDUUDQWHGFLUFXPVWDQFHV
2QH PLJKW DUJXH LQ VXSSRUW RI 0RGHO  ELIXUFDWLRQ WKDW ZKHUH %
HQWHUVLQWRDQLQLWLDOGHIHUUHGVDOHWUDQVDFWLRQZLWK$RXWVLGHWKHRUGLQDU\
FRXUVH RI EXVLQHVV DQG LV WKHUHIRUH H[SHFWHG WR search WKH 335 IRU
FRPSHWLQJLQWHUHVWVLWLVVHQVLEOHWKDW%VKRXOGDOVREHH[SHFWHGWRregister
LIWKHERXJKWJRRGVDUHOHIWLQ$¶VSRVVHVVLRQ7KHUHLVFHUWDLQO\DORJLFDO
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQVHDUFKLQJDQGUHJLVWHULQJEXWWKLVFRQQHFWLRQGRHVQRW
MXVWLI\WKH0RGHODSSURDFK,IDGLVSXWHHUXSWVEHWZHHQ%DQG&GXHWR
DQXQDXWKRUL]HGUHVDOHE\$LWLVWKHQDWXUHRIDQGGHWDLOVVXUURXQGLQJWKH
subsequentWUDQVDFWLRQEHWZHHQ$DQG&QRWWKHLQLWLDOWUDQVDFWLRQEHWZHHQ
$DQG%WKDWVKRXOGEHGHWHUPLQDWLYH&SOD\HGQRUROHLQFUHDWLQJWKH
FLUFXPVWDQFHVVXUURXQGLQJWKHWUDQVDFWLRQEHWZHHQ$DQG%DQGWKHUHIRUH
VKRXOGQRWEHDIIHFWHGE\WKHP%XWWKHUHYHUVHLVQRWWUXH%GLGSOD\D
NH\UROHLQFUHDWLQJWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVXQGHUZKLFKDQXQDXWKRUL]HGUHVDOH
IURP$WR&FRXOGWDNHSODFH$VVXFKLIWKHVXEVHTXHQWVDOHWR&RFFXUV
LQWKHRUGLQDU\FRXUVHRI$¶VEXVLQHVVWKHQ&PXVWEHSURWHFWHGDJDLQVW%
ZKHWKHURUQRW%¶VLQWHUHVWLVGLVFRYHUDEOHYLD335GHEWRUQDPHVHDUFK
,IKRZHYHUWKDWVDOHWR&RFFXUVRXWVLGHWKHRUGLQDU\FRXUVHRIEXVLQHVV
 0RGHOHPXODWHV0RGHOLQWKLVUHVSHFWDQGFDQEHFULWLFL]HGRQWKHVDPHJURXQGV
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then regardless of the nature of the initial transaction, B should be entitled
to registration-based protection.
It is important to note that Model 3 personal property security
legislation characterizes all buyers who enter into a sale of goods without
a change of possession, not merely a special class of them, as deemed
secured parties bound by the PPSA’s registration requirements. This is
problematic since deemed secured parties under the NSPPSA are typically
specialized, highly sophisticated parties who regularly engage with the
PPR and its statutory trappings, and therefore can reasonably be expected
to understand the technical legal system within which they operate.
Examples include commercial consignors,63 leasing companies,64 accounts
factors65 and chattel paper ¿nanciers.66 In juxtaposition, buyers represent
a far more generalized class. Under Model 3, all buyers—multinational
corporations, lawyers, retired teachers, unemployed musicians, etc.—
are subject to the strict registration requirements of the NSPPSA and the
severe consequences that attend failure to register.67 Indeed, where the sale
from A to B happens to occur outside the ordinary course of A’s business,
Model 3 has the potential to impose a harsh outcome on an unwitting B.
Model 3 incentivizes A’s trustee in bankruptcy to challenge the
ownership of any person whose purchased property is left in A’s possession
at the time of bankruptcy. If successful, the trustee in bankruptcy may
claim the goods for the bene¿t of the bankrupt estate and its general
creditors. For example, a trustee in bankruptcy might argue that what
may have initially appeared to be an ordinary course sale from A to B in
fact constituted a sale outside the ordinary course of A’s business, thereby
triggering the NSPPSA’s registration requirement, which invariably will
be unsatis¿ed in such circumstances. The dearth of case law on this point
is surprising.68 In any case, I can think of no compelling reason why a
63. NSPPSA, supra note 33, ss 2(1)(h), “commercial consignment” and 2(1)(ar)(ii)(A), “security
interest”. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “commercial consignment” and “security interest”;
NLPPSA, supra note 33, ss 2(1)(h), 2(1)(pp)(2)(A).
64. NSPPSA, supra note 33, ss 2(1)(y), “lease for a term of more than one year,” and 2(1)(ar)(ii)(B),
“security interest.” See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “lease for a term of more than one year,”
“security interest”; NLPPSA, supra note 33, ss 2(1)(y), 2(1)(pp)(2)(B).
65. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(ar)(ii)(C), “security interest.” See also NBPPSA, supra note 33,
s 1(1)(b)(iii), “security interest”; NLPPSA, supra note 33, 2(1)(pp)(2)(C), “security interest.”
66. Ibid.
67. Anecdotally, just in the last year alone I can recall at least three instances in which I have
purchased goods and temporarily left them in the sellers’ possession. On each occasion I accepted the
risks associated with not registering under Saskatchewan law, but that is only because the stakes were
quite low. Had I been making larger purchases of, say, mining equipment, a crane or a drilling rig, I
de¿nitely would have availed myself of the SSGA’s optional registration-based protection.
68. A recent case law search reveals that the term “sale of goods without a change of possession” has
never received any substantive consideration by a court.
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trustee in bankruptcy should be in a position to negate B’s ownership of
the goods. A’s unsecured creditors cannot nullify B’s ownership of the
goods prior to A’s bankruptcy, so there is no logical basis to confer such an
extraordinary power on the trustee in bankruptcy.
While intricate (aesthetically appealing, from a law professor’s
perspective) and internally coherent, Model 3 is needlessly complex and
imposes excessive risk on buyers out of possession in too broad an array
of circumstances. In other barely distinguishable circumstances, Model 3
does not offer formal registration-based protection to B, instead resolving
the matter exclusively with reference to a statutory provision drafted in
England in the late nineteenth century.
4. Model 4—Prince Edward Island
An evaluation of Prince Edward Island’s regime yields mixed results given
the hybrid nature of Model 4. Where the initial sale from A to B occurs
in the ordinary course of A’s business, Model 4 offers B sensible, though
attenuated, registration-based protection against C. To this extent, Model
4 can be commended on the same grounds as Model 2.
However, where the initial sale from A to B occurs outside the
ordinary course of A’s business, Model 4 exhibits the same Àaws as Model
3, imposing harsh consequences on B if she fails to effect registration in
relation to her deemed security interest. While Model 4 can be commended
for offering B registration-based protection in all circumstances, this
strength is offset by its partial adoption of the Model 3 system.
Conclusion
The “seller in possession” ABC problem presents an interesting example
of diversity in Canadian sales law. Some jurisdictions have opted to
incorporate modernized electronic PPR infrastructure (designed for
registration of notice of non-possessory interests in personal property)
into their statutory priority governance structures for resolution of the
problem, while other jurisdictions have not. Some have gone the full
distance and brought such transactions under PPSA governance, while
other jurisdictions have refrained from going that far. In my view, for the
reasons given above, Model 2 jurisdictions most appropriately de¿ne B’s
risk exposure while offering reasonable facilities for the protection of his
or her non-possessory ownership interest. In my view, Model 2 is most
consonant with and responsive to legitimate commercial expectations and
needs. Model 2 best balances the competing interests at stake and furnishes
buyers with registration-based protection should they ever ¿nd themselves
unable to take immediate possession of bought goods.
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I will close with some words of wisdom for buyers across common
law Canada. One who buys goods without taking possession thereof
places himself at risk—in some circumstances, signi¿cant risk—of loss of
the proprietary claim. In jurisdictions where registration-based protection
is permissible or mandatory, B should register notice of ownership in the
PPR to gain optimal protection against third party competitors. Failure to
register may prove fatal to the proprietary claim. Even in those jurisdictions
where registration is not statutorily sanctioned, B should consider
registering as a means of delivering notice to C. Finally, in addition to
whatever registration-based protection is available under the applicable
statutory scheme, B should ensure, where possible, that a mark or tag is
fastened to goods left in A’s possession, thereby placing any prospective
buyer, C, on notice of B’s ownership interest and defeating his claim to
a QHPRGDWexception. Sometimes the best technology is old technology.

